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a b s t r a c t 
We develop a two-period dual-channel model for a durable goods manufacturer to investigate how prod- 
uct durability and the channel structure create strategic issues that are signiﬁcantly different from those 
in managing a dual channel for nondurables. The manufacturer can sell directly by its own e-channel 
and indirectly via an independent reseller. Our game-theoretic model nests Arya et al. (2007) as a spe- 
cial case when product durability reduces to zero and thus generalizes it to the durable goods setting. 
The equilibrium solutions indicate that, when the product is durable, both parties’ proﬁtability strongly 
depends on product durability and direct selling cost. In particular, we ﬁnd that, compared to encroach- 
ing the reseller’s market by direct selling online, it is optimal for the manufacturer to open an inactive 
e-channel that serves only as an information medium. Moreover, we ﬁnd that, contrary to Arya et al.’s 
(2007) results, if product durability is moderate, for any direct selling cost, manufacturer’s encroachment 
is always detrimental to the reseller, and thus its bright side disappears. We test our model’s theoreti- 
cal predictions of the effects of product durability on manufacturer’s and reseller’s proﬁtability with data 
from the U.S. x86 computer server market, and ﬁnd strong empirical support-proﬁtability of both parties 
is higher when product durability is suﬃciently low or suﬃciently high, and lower when durability is 
intermediate. 
© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license. 
( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ ) 
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1 The time inconsistency problem refers to a situation in which rational con- 
sumers, anticipating that the monopolist has an incentive to increase product avail- 
ability and lower its price over time, postpone purchases until the price falls to a 
h
0
(. Introduction 
Many durable goods manufacturers, including Lenovo, HP, Ep-
on and IKEA, have adopted dual channels to market their prod-
cts ( Epson, 2016; Hewlett-Packard; IKEA, 2016; Lenovo, 2016 ).
urable goods pose a number of questions that are quite differ-
nt from those in nondurable goods marketing ( Desai & Puro-
it, 1998;1999 ). For example, when facing encroachment from an
pstream agent (manufacturer), a downstream agent (reseller) of
urable goods is in a more diﬃcult position than the reseller of
ondurable goods because with durable goods, the reseller is not
nly essentially competing with the new products from the manu-
acturer today but also dealing with the used units tomorrow. On
he other hand, if consumers are able to anticipate the manufac-∗ Corresponding author. 
E-mail addresses: xyu20 0 0@gmail.com (Y. Xiong), bizcj@nus.edu.sg (J. Chu), 
iongzhongkai@cqu.edu.cn (Z. Xiong). 
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manufacturers, European Journal of Operational Research (2017), http:/urer’s incentive to increase product availability and lower prices,
 time-inconsistency problem 1 arises under which the manufac-
urer’s sequence of direct selling may not maximize both parties’
verall proﬁtability 2 . In practice, in some durable goods industries
e.g., the home furniture industry), 66% of manufacturers report
nternet channel conﬂict 3 as the largest obstacle to their online
ales ( Lee et al., 2003 ). Indeed, ﬁnding the best way to utilize the
-channel in conjunction with the reseller channel continues to
e a challenge for many durable goods manufacturers. For exam-ompetitive level. This issue is formalized in Stokey (1981) and Bulow (1982) . 
2 Such issues are aptly addressed in a comprehensive review of several questions 
nvolved in durable goods marketing in Waldman (1993) . 
3 Lee, Lee, and Larsen (2003) use this term to describe a conﬂict that occurs 
hen Internet and traditional bricks-and-mortar channels compete against each 
ther when selling to the same markets. 
 under the CC BY-NC-ND license. 
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Fig. 1. Vertical and horizontal competition in dual-channel supply chain. 
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t  ple, in the personal computer market, to avoid alienating its re-
sellers, HP chooses to sell direct only to its 1,0 0 0 largest accounts
and leave the large accounts to the resellers. Unfortunately, the re-
verse seems to be happening—HP’s resellers are clashing with HP
over direct sales—“We are now nervous about engaging with cer-
tain HP people; they have taken business direct even though the
deal was registered and approached some of our longest standing
customers,” said Repton boss Greg Carlow ( MicroScope, 2009 ). In
contrast, Gateway closed all its manufacturer-owned retail stores
in 2004 and now distributes its products through its direct Inter-
net channel and independent retailers such as Best Buy and Costco
( Yoo & Lee, 2011 ). Particularly, among the durable goods manu-
facturers that adopt dual channels to consumers, the marketing
strategies chosen by them are quite different from one another.
For example, Epson, HP, IKEA, and Lenovo sell their products in
both channels, 3M, NEC, and Whirlpool, in contrast, accept no or-
ders online but simply use the Internet as a medium for product
information provision and reseller links. There is scant literature,
however, addressing product durability and its impact on players’
optimal strategies in a dual-channel supply chain 4 . 
In this paper, we develop a two-period game-theoretic model to
investigate how product durability and the channel structure create
strategic issues that are signiﬁcantly different from those in man-
aging a dual channel for nondurables. Speciﬁcally, we intend to an-
swer the following questions: Under what conditions is it optimal
for a durable goods manufacturer to open an e-channel? How does
the addition of an e-channel affect manufacturer’s and reseller’s
performance? What is the implication of product durability in the
manufacturer’s choice of e-channel addition and in channel mem-
bers’ performance? Our model accounts for the strategic effects of
product durability, channel structure, and direct selling cost, and
is able to capture several characteristics salient in many of today’s
durable goods markets. Further, our model reduces to Arya, Mitten-
dorf and Sappington (2007) when product durability goes to zero,
thus it nests Arya et al. as a special case and generalizes it to the
durable goods setting. Therefore, our model can account for the
strategic effects of product durability, channel structure, and direct
selling cost, and is able to capture several characteristics salient in
many of today’s durable goods markets. 
Our model provides new insights about marketing durables
in dual-channel supply chains. The equilibrium solutions indi-
cate that, when the product is durable, both parties’ proﬁtability
strongly depends on product durability and direct selling cost. In
particular, we ﬁnd that, under certain conditions, compared to en-
croaching the reseller’s market by direct selling online, it is opti-
mal for the manufacturer to open an inactive e-channel that serves
only as an information medium. Further, contrary to Arya, Mit-
tendorf and Sappington (2007) results, our model shows that, if
product durability is moderate, for any direct selling cost, manu-
facturer encroachment is always detrimental to the reseller, mean-
ing its bright side disappears. These results imply that durable
goods manufacturers should be more cautious when adding an
e-channel. Our ﬁndings are consistent with the industry practice
that many durable goods manufacturers are using the Internet only
as a medium for providing product information and links to re-
sellers but not accepting orders online. Some studies (e.g., Gilbert
& Bacheldor, 20 0 0; King, 20 0 0; Webb, 20 02 ) explain this practice
may stem from manufacturers’ reluctance to upset their resellers.
We instead ﬁnd this choice as the manufacturers’ wish to use the
Internet as a strategic channel for control because they can obtain4 Although Xiong, Yan, Fernandes, Xiong, and Guo (2012) examine the reseller’s 
strategic choices of leasing and selling in a dual-channel supply chain, they assume 
that the product does not deteriorate over time, and thus they have ignored the 
issue created by product durability. 
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Please cite this article as: W. Yan et al., Clicks versus Bricks: The ro
manufacturers, European Journal of Operational Research (2017), http:/igher proﬁts from using a sham e-channel than accepting orders
nline. 
Our model contributes to the literature in several important
ays. First, we address an aspect mostly ignored by extant re-
earch in the dual-channel area: the fact that many manufacturers
ccept no orders online despite their potential ﬂexibility and ca-
ability to sell products through an e-channel. Hence, unlike prior
tudies, which take the structure of the distribution system as a
iven and often assume that products are sold through both chan-
els, we endogenize channel choice and allow the manufacturer to
hoose whether or not to sell units through the e-channel. Second,
e examine an issue that is minimally covered in the existing liter-
ture, the role of product durability in a dual-channel supply chain.
s shown by our model, both manufacturer’s and reseller’s prof-
tability depends critically on product durability, and the equilib-
ium results and conclusions can be quite different when product
urability is factored in. Third, although the question of whether
anufacturer encroachment results in “Internet channel conﬂict”
r brings Pareto gains to both parties has been well studied in
ual-channel supply chains for nondurables, cost concerns aside,
ittle is known about how product durability and channel structure
an affect these results. In this paper, we analyze the importance of
uch factors in shaping both parties’ policies and determining their
roﬁts. Fourth, we go a step further to test our model’s empirical
alidity. Our model predicts that both parties are likely to be bene-
cial if product durability is either suﬃciently small or suﬃciently
arge. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
ection 2 reviews the related literature and explains our con-
ributions in more detail. Section 3 describes the key elements
f our basic model and introduces notations. Section 4 outlines
wo models—the single-channel and the dual-channel model—and
eports our main ﬁndings. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
. Relevant literature 
Because the manufacturer is both a supplier to and a competi-
or of the reseller, a dual-channel supply chain contains two main
ypes of channel competition: vertical competition and horizontal
ompetition (see Fig. 1 ). 
Vertical competition induces a double marginalization problem:
ll channel members independently seek to maximize their own
roﬁts, the manufacturer charges more than marginal cost, and
he intermediary cuts supply, which leads to lower sales quantities
nd proﬁts than in a vertically integrated channel ( Spengler, 1950 ).le of durability in marketing channel strategy of durable goods 
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5 For a thorough review of the literature on durable goods, see Waldman (2003) . any coordination policy remedies have been proposed to elimi-
ate the double marginalization problem (e.g., Cachon & Lariviere,
005; Cai, 2010; Caldieraro & Coughlan, 2007; Chick, Mamani &
imchi-Levi, 2008; Chung, Talluri & Narasimhan, 2014) . Xiao and
hi (2016) study the channel priority strategy in a dual channel
upply chain where potential supply shortage is possible. They ﬁnd
hat channel coordination may reduce the retailer’s complaint of
upply shortage. Chen, Liang, Yao, and Sun (2017) analyse the ver-
ical competition when quality decision is incorporated in dual-
hannel supply chain in addition to the well studied price decision.
hey show that the introduction of a new channel can improve
uality. Zhao, Hou, Guo, and Wei (2017) extend the single man-
facturer single retailer supply chain structure to a supply chain
onsisting two manufacturers and one retailer, and investigate the
mpacts of consumer channel loyalty, complementarity and mar-
et power structures on the pricing decisions. Saha, Sarmah, and
odak (2017) extend the levels of supply chain and explore the
hannel structures of three-echelon supply chain. They ﬁnd that
ntroduction of dual channel is not always proﬁtable for the chan-
el members. Most of existing research studies the price compe-
ition assuming that the manufacturer and retailer set the retail
rices simultaneously. Matsui (2017) studies the timing problem in
ual channel supply chain and ﬁnd that the manufacturer should
ost the direct price before or upon setting the wholesale price for
he retailer. Zhang, He, and Shi (2017) study when a retailer de-
ides to move to dual channel rather than a manufacturer, what
s the channel structure choice. Results show that retailer’s chan-
el choice depends on customers’ acceptance rate for the online
hannel. 
Horizontal competition research in dual-channel supply chains
as two different tracks. The ﬁrst emphasizes that manufacturer
ncroachment establishes the manufacturer as both a supplier to
nd a direct competitor of its reseller partners, which potentially
xerts competitive pressure on the reseller by increasing the man-
facturer’s negotiation power and decreasing the loyalty of retail
ustomers. It thus results in Internet channel conﬂict, which has
een the subject of several studies. For example, Webb (2002) and
ee et al. (2003) propose practical guidelines for Internet chan-
el conﬂict management. Liu and Zhang (2006) explore whether
 retailer can beneﬁt from personalized pricing and how upstream
ersonalized pricing or entry into a direct distribution channel af-
ects the allocation of channel proﬁt. They conclude that a retailer
s worse off because of its own or upstream personalized pricing.
attani, Gilland, Heese, and Swaminathan (2006) liken a manufac-
urer who adds a direct channel to the parable of boiling frog:
f the costs and average convenience of the Internet channel be-
ome more favorable over time, then the manufacturer will be
n a position to use the direct channel to undercut the prices in
he traditional channel and so “boil” the traditional retailer. Webb
nd Lambe (2007) focus on the conﬂict internal to the supplier
rm among the groups and individuals responsible for managing
he various channels. The second research stream, in contrast, ar-
ues that both the manufacturer and the incumbent reseller ben-
ﬁt from manufacturer encroachment; that is, manufacturer en-
roachment can lead to Pareto gains. Chiang, Chhajed, and Hess
2003) construct a price-setting game between a manufacturer and
ts independent retailer, and demonstrate a Pareto zone in which
oth the manufacturer and the retailer can be better off after the
anufacturer enters the direct channel. Chun, Rhee, Park, and Kim
2011) extend these ﬁndings by showing that, under certain cir-
umstances, both manufacturers and retailers are better off in a
ual distribution channel. Tsay and Agrawal (2004) demonstrate
hat the addition of a direct channel alongside a reseller channel is
ot necessarily detrimental to the reseller. Xiong et al. (2012) then
ddress the strategies of selling and leasing in a dual-channel sup-
ly chain and ﬁnd that both the dealer and the supply chain mayPlease cite this article as: W. Yan et al., Clicks versus Bricks: The ro
manufacturers, European Journal of Operational Research (2017), http:/eneﬁt from the manufacturer’s encroachment. Luo, Li, and Cheng
2016) investigate the free ride effect in the dual-channel supply
hain where pre-sales services are provided by the retailer and
nd that free ride effect has both positive and negative impact.
hen the manufacturing cost and customer demand are fuzzy,
oleimani (2016) develops two models using game theoretical ap-
roach and fuzzy set theory to optimize the pricing decision. 
Our work is distinct from this extant literature in two impor-
ant aspects: First, the above papers, like much of the extant liter-
ture, ignore product durability and pay little attention to its im-
act on players’ optimal strategies. We attempt to help ﬁll this
oid by addressing the issue of product durability and analyz-
ng how it creates strategic issues that are signiﬁcantly different
rom those in managing a dual-channel for nondurables. Second,
s mentioned earlier, most studies in the dual-channel area as-
ume both the structure of the distribution system and the sale
f products through both channels, thereby ignoring a manufac-
urer’s ﬂexibility in whether or not to sell through the e-channel.
ur dual-channel model, in contrast, endogeneizes the channel
ecision and allows the manufacturer to choose whether to sell
hrough its own direct channel. 
In particular, our work is closely related to Arya, Mittendorf and
appington (2007) and Xiong et al. (2012) , but different from them
n important ways. We generalize Arya, Mittendorf and Sapping-
on (2007) to the durable goods setting and nest it as a special
ase. We differ from Xiong et al. (2012) in two important aspects.
irst, they assume that the product is perfectly durable and does
ot deteriorate over time, and thus they have ignored the issue
f how product durability affects the interactions between a man-
facturer and its dealers. In contrast, we assume that the prod-
ct will deteriorate over time and investigate how this parameter
reate strategic issues that are signiﬁcantly different from those in
anaging a dual channel for nondurables. Second, they focus on
he effects of encroachment on the dealer’s strategic choice of leas-
ng and selling, which we ﬁnd is very uncommon in practice—–few
esellers we contacted directly and searched in the PC magazine
nd other related publications adopt a mix of selling and leasing
o consumers. We instead focus on a much more common channel
ssue facing manufacturers of durable goods in terms of e-channel
hoice, product durability and its impact on channel performance. 
Our work is also related to the literature on durable goods,
hich argues that durability can interfere with the extraction of
ents from consumers. Coase (1972) conjectures that rational con-
umers, anticipating a monopolist’s incentive to increase product
vailability and lower its price over time, postpone their purchases
ntil the price falls to the competitive level. They label this likeli-
ood the “time-inconsistency problem”. According to Bulow (1986) ,
his problem can be avoided if the durable goods manufacturer
dopts “planned obsolescence” to kill off the market for old copies
nd force customers to make repeat purchases. An incentive to
ractice such planned obsolescence arises if a monopolist markets
ts output by selling rather than leasing Waldman (1993) . While,
hen, Esteban, and Shum (2013) conclude that the size of the used
ood stock decreases, such as when products become less durable,
hen the number of ﬁrms decreases, or when ﬁrms can commit to
uture production levels, increase the proﬁtability of opening the
econdary market 5 . 
Different from the previous research, this paper strives to un-
erstand how product durability creates strategic issues, speciﬁ-
ally, the impact of product durability on manufacturer’s channel
ecision, manufacturer’s, reseller’s and supply chain performance. le of durability in marketing channel strategy of durable goods 
/dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2017.08.039 
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p3. Model development 
In this section, we introduce our notation and lay out our as-
sumptions regarding the product, the manufacturer, the reseller,
and the consumers. Assuming a two-period model in which a
manufacturer markets a durable product through two channels—a
reseller channel and her 6 own e-channel, we adopt the Arya, Mit-
tendorf and Sappington (2007) assumptions about the sequence
of the game between the manufacturer and the reseller, that is,
the manufacturer decides whether to operate a direct channel and
then announces the wholesale price to the reseller, who then re-
sponds by determining the optimal units of selling. The manufac-
turer then chooses the units to be sold through the e-channel. 
3.1. Product 
To capture the durability of a product, we use a two-period
model 7 in which the products produced in Period 1 provide two
periods of service: they are “new” when marketed in Period 1 and
then classiﬁed as “used” in Period 2. Products produced in Period
2, in contrast, provide only one period of service. Hence, in our
model, only new products are available in Period 1, but both new
and used products (i.e., those marketed in Period 1) are available
in Period 2. We also assume that the manufacturer and the re-
seller always sell new products in both periods; that is, used prod-
ucts are traded between consumers on the secondary market 8 . The
market clearance price will be achieved in the equilibrium. 
To model the differentiation between new and used units, we
designate the durability of the products produced in Period 1 us-
ing a factor γ (0 ≤γ ≤1). If γ = 1 , the product is perfectly durable
and shows no deterioration over time, meaning that in Period 2,
used units are identical to new units. If γ = 0 , the product is non-
durable and deteriorates fully after one period of use. 
3.2. Manufacturer’s problem 
The manufacturer’s problem is to set a wholesale price ( w i ) and
choose units to sell through the e-channel ( q iM ) that will maximize
her proﬁts. Here, i = 1 , 2 denotes Period 1 or 2. As in Arya, Mit-
tendorf and Sappington (2007) , we normalize her marginal cost of
production to zero and assume that her marginal cost of selling on
the e-channel is C d = c ≥ 0 . This models the reseller’s cost advan-
tage in the sales process. 
3.3. Reseller’s problem 
If the manufacturer sets her wholesale price, the reseller must
choose the quantities that he intends to sell to maximize his proﬁt.
To ensure that the reseller has an advantage in the distribution
channel and recalling that the manufacturer’s unit direct selling
cost is C d = c ≥ 0 , we, similar to Arya et al. (2007) , assume that the
reseller’s unit marketing cost is C R = 0 . This is because when sell-
ing to consumers directly, the manufacturer incurs packaging and
delivery cost, while there is no such cost for retailer who has es-
tablished the physical channel. Therefore, when modeling the unit
selling cost, it is reasonable to assume that the reseller’s unit mar-
keting cost is zero. 6 In reporting our computations, for purposes of differentiation, we use the fem- 
inine pronoun to refer to the manufacturer and the masculine pronoun to refer to 
the reseller. 
7 This assumption is consistent with previous literature (e.g., Desai & Purohit, 
1998; 1999 ). A two-period model not only allows us to study dynamic issues while 
retaining tractability but simpliﬁes the presentation of our analysis. 
8 For example, with the development of the internet and information technology, 
electronic peer-to-peer (P2P) markets become popular, and consumers can buy and 
sell used products among themselves in electronic peer-to-peer (P2P) used goods 
markets (e.g., eBay.com, Amazon.com). 
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The size of the consumer population is assumed not to change
ver time and is normalized to 1. To enable a focus on product
urability and dual-channel characteristics, we assume that con-
umers value the product for the ﬂow of services that it provides
ver time. We also assume that no consumer can use more than
ne unit of the product in any period ( Purohit & Staelin, 1994 ). We
se the parameter θ to represent a consumer’s valuation of the
ervice provided by a durable per period, which is distributed uni-
ormly in the interval [0, 1]. Consumer type θ has a valuation of
for a new product. Recalling that the durability of the product
represents how well a unit sold in Period 1 holds up in Period
 (when it is classiﬁed as “used”), then consumer type θ has a
aluation of γ θ for a used product. However, the consumers do
ot distinguish the products sold by different channels. Following
urohit and Staelin (1994) , we do not model how consumer choose
rom different channels, but rather focus on the quantities sold by
eseller and e-channel directly, which leads to the reverse demand
unction in the ﬁrst period. 
Denote q iM and q iR , respectively, as the quantity sold by the
anufacturer and the reseller in period i , and let l ik be the price of
he services provided by product k in period i , where k = n, u refers
o, respectively, new products and used products. Following the
ame procedure of Agrawal, Ferguson, Toktay, and Thomas (2012) ;
esai and Purohit (1998) , we derive the inverse demand functions
rom the consumer utility functions for Period 2. The one-period
rices for a new and a used product in Period 2 are given, respec-
ively, by 
 2 n = 1 − γ (q 1 R + q 1 M ) − q 2 R − q 2 M 
 2 u = γ (1 − q 1 R − q 2 R − q 1 M − q 2 M ) 
(1)
Because only new products are available in Period 1, by apply-
ng the same procedure of Purohit and Staelin (1994) , we can have
he one-period price for a new product in Period 1 as follows: 
 1 n = 1 − q 1 R − q 1 M (2)
The durable produced in Period 1 can provide a stream of ser-
ices for both periods; hence, its selling price is the sum of the
ne-period price for a new product in Period 1 and the one-period
rice for a used product in Period 2; that is, p 1 n = l 1 n + ρl 2 u ,
here ρ is a discount factor denoting the cash ﬂows received in
eriod 2. To simplify, we assume a zero discount rate and a dis-
ount factor ρ = 1 9 . Since a durable produced in Period 2 provides
nly one period of service, its selling price is p 2 n = l 2 n . 
. Model analysis 
In this section, we consider both parties’ optimal strategies and
nalyze how they are affected by durability. That is, we look ﬁrst
t a single-channel model in which no e-channel is open and then
onsider a dual-channel model in which the manufacturer opens
er own e-channel and sells products through both it and a re-
eller channel. It should be noted that in the dual-channel supply
hain, the manufacturer has the ﬂexibility to sell or not sell her
roducts through the e-channel. 
.1. Model S—a single-channel model 
We begin our analysis by ﬁrst considering a single-channel
odel that serves as a useful benchmark for the subsequent
odel, which allows horizontal competition in a dual channel
upply chain. From Eqs. (1) and (2) , we derive the following9 Although allowing the discount factor 0 < ρ < 1 increases the complexity of the 
nalysis, all our results remain unaffected. 
le of durability in marketing channel strategy of durable goods 
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Fig. 2. Optimal proﬁts in the single-channel and pure selling models. 
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o  ingle-channel inverse demand functions: 
p 1 n = l 1 n + l 2 u = 1 − q 1 R + γ (1 − q 1 R − q 2 R ) (3) 
p 2 n = l 2 n = 1 − γ q 1 R − q 2 R (4) 
We perform the ensuing analysis using backward induction,
hat is, we ﬁrst determine both parties’ optimal policies in Period 2
nd then solve their problems in Period 1. This backward induction
s necessary because consumers’ expectations are rational, meaning
hat a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium can be determined. 
.1.1. Second-period analysis 
In this analysis, we use lowercase π j 
i 
(uppercase  j 
i 
) to repre-
ent the reseller’s (manufacturer’s) proﬁt in period i under model
 , where j = s, d refers to the single-channel model and the dual-
hannel model, respectively. The reseller maximizes his proﬁts over
oth periods by choosing optimal quantities of q 1 R and q 2 R . Then,
nder the single-channel model, the reseller proﬁt in Period 2 is
ax 
q 2 R 
π s 
2 
(q 2 R , w 2 ) = p 2 n q 2 R − w 2 q 2 R . Plugging (3) into the reseller’s
roﬁt and solving the ﬁrst-order condition yields q s ∗
2 R 
, so that the
hoice of q s ∗
2 R 
is 
 
s ∗
2 R = 
1 − γ q 1 R − w 2 
2 
(5) 
orking backwards, plugging (4) into s 
2 
(q 1 R , w 2 ) and solving the
rst-order condition yields w s ∗
2 
: 
 
s ∗
2 = 
1 − γ q 1 R 
2 
(6) 
.1.2. First-period analysis 
Given the optimal solution for the second-period problem, we
ow look at both parties’ ﬁrst-period policies. In Period 1, the
eseller’s objective is to maximize his proﬁts in both periods,
ax 
q 1 R 
π s (q 1 R , w 1 ) = π s 1 (q 1 R , w 1 ) + π s ∗2 (q 1 R , w 1 ) , while the manufac-
urer’s problem is to choose a wholesale price w s ∗
1 
that maximizes
er proﬁts in both periods, max w 1 
s (q 1 R , w 1 ) = s 1 (q 1 R , w 1 ) +
s ∗
2 
(q 1 R , w 2 ) . Maximizing the reseller’s proﬁt yields q 
s ∗
1 R 
, which,
hen substituted into the manufacturer’s proﬁt, yields w s ∗
1 
. Sub-
tituting the ensuing q s ∗
1 R 
and w s ∗
1 
into the quantities in (4) and the
holesale price in (5) provides the equilibrium outcome under the
ingle-channel model, which is presented in Lemma 1 in Appendix
. 
It is of particular interest to compare the result in Lemma 1
ith that of the No-Encroachment Setting in Arya, Mittendorf and
appington (2007) , in which a manufacturer distributes a non-
urable through both an e-channel and a reseller channel. Their
utcome is identical to our result for the fully deteriorated prod-
ct, γ = 0 . Therefore, our model nests theirs as a special case. 
To analyze the role played by product durability and the effects
f endogenizing the reseller, it is of interest to compare the results
n Model S with that of Desai and Purohit (1998) ’s Pure Selling
odel, in which the manufacturer sells durables to consumers di-
ectly. Using superscript b to represent the results from the Pure
elling Model in Desai and Purohit (1998) and representing the to-
al proﬁt in the pure selling model and the single-channel model
y b∗
T 
and s ∗
T 
, respectively, we can compare the two outcomes
nd summarize the ﬁndings in the following proposition: 
roposition 1. (a) The optimal total proﬁt of b∗
T 
( s ∗
T 
) is convex in
b ( γ s ) and achieve minimum in medium durability of γ b ( γ s ). 
(b) The presence of the reseller induces a double marginalization
roblem, q s ∗
1 R 
+ q s ∗
2 R 
< q b∗
1 M 
+ q b∗
2 M 
, s ∗
T 
< b∗
T 
, which induces the min-
mum point of the optimal total proﬁt to move leftward in the dura-
ility domain, γ s < γ b . 
roof. See Appendix B. Please cite this article as: W. Yan et al., Clicks versus Bricks: The ro
manufacturers, European Journal of Operational Research (2017), http:/Durability, particularly, plays an interesting and intuitively likely
ole in the manufacturer’s choice of the optimal quantity: Not only
s there cannibalization of new products by used ones in Period 2,
ut as durability increases, used and new products become closer
ubstitutes and the cannibalization effect intensiﬁes, causing the
anufacturer to derive less revenue from new products in Period
. Conversely, as durability increases, the consumer’s valuation of
 used product ( γ θ ) increases and the price of the used product
ncreases, which causes the manufacturer to derive more revenue
rom new products in Period 1. 
Proposition 1 (a) also shows that as long as durability is smaller
han the threshold (i.e., γ b and γ s ), the former component dom-
nates, that is, the difference between used and new products is
uﬃcient and the cannibalization effect becomes less signiﬁcant, so
hat the manufacturer obtains more revenue from new products in
eriod 2. The manufacturer should therefore sell fewer units in Pe-
iod 1 and adopt higher prices for new products in Period 2. How-
ver, if 1 > γ > γ b ( γ s ), the latter component dominates, that is, the
ifference between used and new products is not suﬃcient and the
annibalization effect intensiﬁes, so that the manufacturer obtains
ore revenue from new products in Period 1. The manufacturer
hus needs to earn more revenue from new products in Period 1
y choosing a smaller quantity of new units in Period 2. 
We then consider the effects of endogenizing a reseller,
hose presence induces q s ∗
1 R 
+ q s ∗
2 R 
< q b∗
1 M 
+ q b∗
2 M 
, s ∗
T 
< b∗
T 
, the
ell-documented double marginalization effect. We ﬁnd that en-
ogenizing a reseller also leads to a leftward move in the mini-
um point of the optimal total proﬁt, that is, γ s < γ b (see Fig. 2 ).
his observation can be explained as follows: the difference be-
ween q s ∗
1 R 
− q b∗
1 M 
and q s ∗
2 R 
− q b∗
2 M 
is increasing with durability, which
eans that the manufacturer faces a more severe double marginal-
zation problem in Period 1 than in Period 2 (see Fig. 3 ). In other
ords, the relative amount of q b∗
1 M 
− q s ∗
1 R 
is larger than q b∗
2 M 
− q s ∗
2 R 
,
eaning that in Model S, as compared with q b∗
1 M 
( q b∗
2 M 
) in the
ure selling model, the manufacturer has a smaller (larger) zone
n which to obtain more revenue from new products in Period 2
1). In other words, the minimum point of the optimal total proﬁt
as moved left, that is, γ s < γ b . 
.2. Model D-Dual-channel model 
The timing in Model D is as follows. Before the game starts, the
anufacturer has opened her own e-channel and decided to oper-
te a direct channel. Then the manufacturer and the reseller play
he following game. The manufacturer announces the wholesale
rice ( w i ) to the reseller, who then responds by determining the
ptimal units of selling ( q ). The manufacturer then chooses theiR 
le of durability in marketing channel strategy of durable goods 
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Fig. 3. q s ∗1 R − q b∗1 M and q s ∗2 R − q b∗2 M . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Strategy choices in Model D. 
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10 Note that Arya, Mittendorf and Sappington (2007) outcome is identical to our 
result for the fully deteriorated product, γ = 0 . Therefore, our model nests theirs as 
a special case. units to be sold through the e-channel ( q iM ). Note that, although
the manufacturer always opens an e-channel, she has the potential
ﬂexibility to sell products through an e-channel or adopt the e-
channel only to provide product information and accept no orders
online. From Eq. (1) and (2) , we can derive the inverse demand
functions in the dual-channel model as follows: 
p 1 n = l 1 n + l 2 u = 1 − q 1 R − q 1 M + γ (1 − q 1 R − q 2 R − q 1 M − q 2 M ) 
(7)
p 2 n = l 2 n = 1 − γ (q 1 R + q 1 M ) − q 2 R − q 2 M (8)
4.2.1. Second-period analysis 
In the dual-channel model, the manufacturer’s problem is 
max 
q 2 M 
d 2 (q 2 M , q 2 R , w 2 ) = w 2 q 2 R + p 2 n q 2 M − cq 2 M (9)
Performing the optimization in (7) yields q d∗
2 M 
. The reseller, antic-
ipating the manufacturer’s response, q d∗
2 M 
, optimizes his proﬁts by
choosing the optimal quantity to sell ( q d∗
2 R 
) in Period 2. That is, he
maximizes 
max 
q 2 R 
π d 2 (q 2 M , q 2 R , w 2 ) = p 2 n q 2 R − w 2 q 2 R (10)
We can then substitute q d∗
2 M 
and q d∗
2 R 
into (9) and maximize this
expression to ﬁnd the optimal wholesale price w d∗
2 
. 
4.2.2. First-period analysis 
The manufacturer (the reseller) optimizes her (his) proﬁts over
both periods by choosing q d∗
1 M 
/ w d∗
1 
( q d∗
2 R 
) in Period 1, yielding the
following proﬁts, respectively: 
max 
q 1 M 
d (w 1 , q 1 R , q 1 M ) = w 1 q 1 R + p 1 n q 1 M − cq 1 M 
+d∗2 (w 1 , q 1 R , q 1 M ) (11)
max 
q 1 R 
π d (w 1 , q 1 R , q 1 M ) = p 1 n q 1 R − w 1 q 1 R + π d∗2 (w 1 , q 1 R , q 1 M ) (12)
As before, using backward induction, we ﬁrst solve the manu-
facturer’s maximization problem with respect to q d∗
1 M 
. The reseller
then maximizes his proﬁts by choosing the optimal q d∗
1 R 
, and given
q d∗
1 M 
and q d∗
1 R 
, the manufacturer determines her ﬁrst-period whole-
sale price ( w d∗
1 
). These results are tabulated in Lemma 2 in Ap-
pendix A. 
Lemma 2 indicates that, in the dual channel supply chain, the
manufacturer can maximize her proﬁt in two ways: opening an in-
active e-channel and/or encroaching the reseller’s market by sellingPlease cite this article as: W. Yan et al., Clicks versus Bricks: The ro
manufacturers, European Journal of Operational Research (2017), http:/he products through the e-channel. And we ﬁnd that this strategic
hoice is affected by both the relative direct sales cost c and prod-
ct durability γ (see Fig. 4) 10 . We summarize our ﬁndings in the
ollowing proposition, which can be obtained from Lemma 2. 
roposition 2. (a) when γ > γ 2 , σ 6 < c < σ 8 ; 0 < γ < γ 3 ,
4 < c < σ 5 and γ 3 < γ < 1, σ 3 < c < σ 5 , the manufacturer starts
ncroaching into the reseller’s market and sells the products through
he e-channel only in Period 1. 
(b) 0 < γ < γ 3 , σ 1 < c < σ 4 and γ 3 < γ < γ 4 , σ 1 < c < σ 3 , the
anufacturer is encroaching further and sells the products through
he e-channel in both periods. 
(c) 0 < γ < γ 4 , 0 < c < σ 1 and γ 4 < γ < 1, 0 < c < σ 2 , the reseller
tarts withdrawing from the retail channel in Period 2. 
The above proposition shows that, in the dual-channel supply
hain, the manufacturer’s strategic choice of encroaching her re-
eller’s market is affected by both product durability γ and the
irect selling cost c . As Xiong et al. (2012) show, the manufacturer
egins to encroach into the market in Period 1 at a higher direct
elling cost, and encroaches into the market in both periods at a
ower direct selling cost. On the other hand, the product durabil-
ty can have an important impact on the manufacturer’s strategic
hoice as well. Take E and F in Fig. 4 for an example. With a ﬁxed
irect selling cost c , comparing the strategic choices of E and F
ased on the durability change, we can ﬁnd that, the manufacturer
s more likely to encroach the reseller’s market in period 1 with a
igher durability, because, as durability increases, the consumer’s
aluation of a used product ( γ θ ) increases and the price of the
sed product increases, which induces the manufacturer to derive
ore revenue from new products in Period 1. 
The general conclusion of previous research in this area (e.g.,
rya, Mittendorf & Sappington, 2007 ; Xiong et al., 2012 ) is that the
anufacturer is better off by encroaching the reseller’s market and
elling online. Yet it is not entirely clear whether this conclusion
ill hold if the manufacturer has the ﬂexibility to open an inactive
-channel. In particular, we formulate the following proposition: 
roposition 3. When 0 < γ < γ 2 , σ 5 < c < σ 7 ; γ 2 ≤γ , σ 5 < c < σ 6 ;
 < γ < γ 1 , σ 7 < c < σ 9 ; γ 1 ≤γ < γ 2 , σ 7 < c < 1 ; γ 2 ≤γ , σ 8 < c < 1
nd 0 < γ < γ 1 , σ 9 < c < 1, compared to encroaching the reseller’s
arket by direct selling online, it is optimal for the manufacturer to
pen an inactive e-channel, that is, opening an e-channel but not sell-
ng products through it, in other words, using the e-channel as a sham
eads to higher proﬁts than a direct selling strategy. le of durability in marketing channel strategy of durable goods 
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Fig. 5. π d∗ − π d∗ . 
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e  roof. See Appendix B. 
This observation is partly similar to that of Chiang et al. (2003) ,
ho conclude that “it is sometimes optimal for an independent
anufacturer to open a direct channel although no direct sales oc-
ur” (P.12). We further ﬁnd, however, that durability plays an im-
ortant role as well. Before explaining Proposition 3 , we brieﬂy ex-
mine the manufacturer’s proﬁts, which come from two sources:
elling products through the e-channel and product wholesaling.
ote that opening an inactive e-channel means that the reseller
aces the potential threat of direct selling, which leads to the re-
eller to lower his price and increase the number of sales units.
roposition 3 can thus be interpreted as follows: when the inac-
ive e-channel is a strong threat (i.e., 0 < γ < γ 2 , σ 5 < c < σ 7 and
2 ≤γ , σ 5 < c < σ 6 ), the manufacturer beneﬁts from adding an
nactive e-channel because it can mitigate the double marginal-
zation problem with her reseller. When γ 2 ≤γ , σ 8 < c < 1, di-
ect selling becomes more costly, the manufacturer has no choice
o open an inactive e-channel. When 0 < γ < γ 1 , σ 7 < c < σ 9 and
1 ≤γ < γ 2 , σ 7 < c < 1, the durability is small (i.e., γ ≤γ 2 ) and
he manufacturer derives little revenue from direct selling 11 . She
hus chooses to add an inactive e-channel because she can beneﬁt
rom it by mitigating the double marginalization problem. When
 < γ < γ 1 , σ 9 < c < 1, the durability is so small and the threat of
n inactive e-channel is so weak that the manufacturer opens an
nactive e-channel though it can be easily overcome by her reseller.
Proposition 3 shows that under certain conditions, opening an
nactive e-channel may lead to higher proﬁts than a direct selling
trategy. This ﬁnding may be consistent with the attitude reﬂected
n the dual-channel program of 3M, NEC, and Whirlpool, which ac-
ept no orders online and simply use the Internet as a medium
or product information provision and reseller links. As suggested
y our model, this choice may stem from a wish to use the In-
ernet as a strategic channel for control, that is, using a sham e-
hannel brings in higher proﬁts than accepting orders online. And
e also note that Gilbert and Bacheldor (20 0 0) ; King (20 0 0) and
ebb (2002) report that they do so for not to upset their resellers.
n our view, however, this explanation is insuﬃcient because none
f these manufacturers has made a public commitment to give up
he choice of direct selling through e-channel and provide prod-
ct information only. And more importantly, instead of the path
f self-sacriﬁce, they can easily ﬁnd many other measures to avoid
he “Internet channel conﬂict” and achieve win-win results. For ex-
mple, Ethan Allen Interiors Inc. shares its online proﬁts with its
icensees. Equipment distributor W.W. Grainger Inc. awards com-
issions to area sales representatives when a customer purchases
rom Grainger.com ( Goldman, 1999 ). Bobbi Brown, however, trans-
ers all her online orders to Neiman Marcus ( Garner, 1999 ). 
.3. Comparison of the two models 
We are now in a position to address the question posed at the
eginning of this paper: How does the addition of an e-channel
ffect both parties’ performance? We answer this question ﬁrst
rom the manufacturer’s point of view, and we have the following
roposition. 
roposition 4. When γ < γ 1 , σ 9 < c < 1, the manufacturer’s proﬁt in
he dual-channel model equals that in the single-channel model; oth-
rwise, the manufacturer’s proﬁt in the dual-channel model is higher
han that in the single-channel model. 
roof. See Appendix B. 11 Recall that, as durability decreases, the consumer’s valuation of a used product 
ecreases, which causes the manufacturer to derive less revenue from new products 
n Period 1. 
t  
w  
o
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Please cite this article as: W. Yan et al., Clicks versus Bricks: The ro
manufacturers, European Journal of Operational Research (2017), http:/Proposition 4 suggests that, in contrast to the conventional wis-
om that the manufacturer is always better off by encroaching
he reseller’s market ( Arya, Mittendorf & Sappington 2007 ; Tsay &
grawal, 2004; Xiong et al., 2012 ), the manufacturer does not al-
ays beneﬁt from adding an e-channel. 
Proposition 4 shows that the manufacturer motivates the re-
eller to lower his price and increase sales units by opening the
-channel. The effectiveness of this strategy, however, depends on
he viability of the threat to sell directly, which, in turn, depends
n the reseller’s cost advantage and product durability. When the
irect cost is below σ 9 , the manufacturer beneﬁts from adding
he e-channel because two factors provide her with greater prof-
ts in the dual-channel model. The reasons behind it are as follows:
irst, it is usually assumed that the manufacturer is the Stackelberg
eader, that is, she takes into account the proﬁt-maximizing actions
f the reseller and simultaneously sets the wholesale price. Sec-
nd, she beneﬁts from direct selling because it not only provides
evenue to her directly but can also mitigate the double marginal-
zation problem between both parties.For the product durability,
hen the manufacturer’s distribution disadvantage exceeds a cer-
ain threshold, speciﬁcally σ 9 < c < 1, and the product durability is
o small (i.e., γ < γ 1 ) that the manufacturer’s proﬁt in the dual-
hannel model equals that in the single-channel model. The intu-
tion underlying this is as follows: When σ 9 < c < 1, the manufac-
urer’s distribution disadvantage is so pronounced that the harm
f the manufacturer’s encroachment to the reseller would seem
o be small. On the other hand, when σ 9 < c < 1, we ﬁnd that, if
he product durability is below a certain threshold, (i.e., γ < γ 1 ),
he revenue in Period 1 of the manufacturer’s encroachment is too
mall to accept no orders online. Thus, when γ < γ 1 , σ 9 < c < 1,
he manufacturer’s proﬁt in the dual-channel model equals that in
he single-channel model. But when γ > γ 1 , the manufacturer will
ncroach the reseller’s market by directly selling, because as dura-
ility increases, the consumer’s valuation of a used product ( γ θ )
ncreases, which induces the manufacturer to derive more revenue
rom new products in Period 1. 
As regards the variations in the reseller’s proﬁtability, i.e., how
ddition of the e-channel affects the reseller’s performance —
ased on Lemmas 1 and 2, we provide the following response (see,
ig. 5 ): 
roposition 5. When 0 < γ < γ 5 , σ 10 < c < σ 11 , γ 5 ≤γ < γ 6 ,
4 < c < σ 12 , γ 7 ≤γ < γ 8 , σ 6 < c < σ 14 and γ 8 ≤γ < 1,
13 < c < σ 14 , the reseller beneﬁts from the encroachment; oth-
rwise, the reseller’s proﬁt in the dual-channel model is lower than
hat in the single-channel model, especially when γ 6 < γ < γ 7 , in
hich case, for any direct selling cost (c), the reseller is always worse
ff in the dual-channel model. 
roof. See Appendix B. le of durability in marketing channel strategy of durable goods 
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Fig. 6. Total proﬁts of the dual-channel supply chain ( c = 0 . 33 ). 
Fig. 7. d∗T − s ∗T . 
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f  These observations—particularly that when γ 6 < γ < γ 7 , the re-
seller is always worse off in the dual-channel model regardless of
the direct selling cost ( c )—are obviously somewhat at odds with
Arya, Mittendorf and Sappington (2007) showing that the retailer
can beneﬁt from encroachment due to the reduction of wholesale
price. To explain this ﬁnding, we must brieﬂy consider the role of
durability in the total proﬁts of a supply chain. Recall that the op-
timal total proﬁts of the single-channel model and the pure selling
model, s ∗
T 
( b∗
T 
), are the lowest for medium durability of γ s ( γ b )
and that the double marginalization problem induces the mini-
mum point of the optimal total proﬁt to move leftward, we can in-
terpret Proposition 5 as follows: As in the single-channel and pure
selling models, the total proﬁt of the dual-channel supply chain
is still convex in durability γ (see Fig. 6 ). 12 When γ 6 < γ < γ 7 ,
the total proﬁt of the dual-channel supply chain is so small that
the manufacturer, acting as the Stackelberg leader, is reluctant to
transfer the proﬁt to the reseller. As a result, the bright side of en-
croachment disappears, which is contrary with the ﬁnding of Arya,
Mittendorf and Sappington (2007) . 
As regards the variation in the supply chain proﬁt—that is, the
effects of encroachment on the supply chain proﬁt—based on Lem-
mas 1 and 2, we offer the following proposition (see Fig. 7 ): 
Proposition 6. When 0 < γ < γ 10 , 0 < c < σ 15 , γ 10 ≤γ < 1,
0 < c < σ 16 , 0 ≤ γ < γ11 , σ d 17 < c < σ d 19 , γ11 ≤ γ < 1 , σ d 18 < c < σ d 19 ,
γ 9 ≤γ < γ 11 , σ 7 < c < σ 20 , γ 11 ≤γ < γ 12 , σ 6 < c < σ 20 and
γ 12 ≤γ < 1, σ 6 < c < 1, the supply chain proﬁt in the dual-channel
model is higher than that in the single-channel model; otherwise, the
opposite is true. 12 We depict the total proﬁt of the dual-channel supply chain for a numerical ex- 
ample. 
i  
L  
c  
(  
Please cite this article as: W. Yan et al., Clicks versus Bricks: The ro
manufacturers, European Journal of Operational Research (2017), http:/Proposition 6 shows that encroachment can enhance the sup-
ly chain proﬁt even when the manufacturer opens an inactive e-
hannel. The intuition behind this is that, in the encroachment set-
ing, the manufacturer always provides lower wholesale prices to
er reseller that leads to limited losses from double marginaliza-
ion. Moreover, we can easily ﬁnd that durability has an impact on
he supply chain proﬁt as well. For example, when γ 9 ≤γ < γ 11 ,
7 < c < σ 20 , total proﬁt in the dual-channel model is higher than
hat in the single-channel model. This can be explained as fol-
ows: notice that the manufacturer starts encroaching into the re-
eller’s market in Period 1 and, as durability increases, the price
f the used product increases and the manufacturer derives more
evenue from new products in Period 1. That is, as durability in-
reases, the manufacturer is more likely to operate the online sell-
ng and starting to encroach the reseller’s market, i.e., the threat
f an e-channel becomes stronger. As durability increases, to avoid
he manufacturer’s encroachment, the reseller sells more units in
is retail channel. For the manufacturer, anticipating that the re-
eller will sell more products through the retail channel, decreases
he wholesale price and opens an inactive e-channel. The manu-
acturer thus beneﬁts from the reduction of losses from double
arginalization and her reseller can beneﬁt from the lower whole-
ale prices. 
. Empirical analysis 
As pointed out earlier, our model tries to investigate how prod-
ct durability creates strategic issues that are signiﬁcantly differ-
nt from those in managing a dual channel for nondurables. Al-
hough, in our model, as in Desai and Purohit (1998,1999) , the
anufacturer does not determine the durability endogenously, it
oes have an important impact on all players’ proﬁtability and de-
ermine their optimal strategies. In particular, we ﬁnd that as long
s the product durability varies, both parties are likely to be bene-
cial if the durability is either suﬃciently small or suﬃciently large
see Propositions 1, 5 and 6 . In other words, the proﬁts of the man-
facturer, the reseller, and the supply chain are convex in product
urability. 
Do these predictions hold empirically? To test these theoretical
redictions, we need data on wholesale margin, retail margin and
roduct durability. We use data from the U.S. x86 computer server
arket for 20 02–20 04. Wholesaler’s, retailer’s and channel mar-
ins are obtained from Chu and Chintagunta (2009) , and product
urability data are from Chu and Chintagunta (2011) . 
The original data in Chu and Chintagunta (2009) are provided
y Gartner ® and have information on quarterly server unit sales,
holesale prices, retail prices, manufacturer names, brands, and
arranty duration (in months) of computer servers at the manu-
acturer brand-model level (e.g., HP ProLiant DL100 servers). The
86 servers are mainly produced by HP, IBM and Dell, and sold
hrough ﬁve distribution channels - direct fax/phone/Web, direct
ales force, indirect fax/phone/Web, local dealer, and value-added
esellers (VARs). Chu and Chintagunta (2009) use structural mod-
ling to infer manufacturer marginal costs and retail marginal costs
for indirect channels), and compute wholesaler’s, retailer’s and to-
al channel margins. 
The quarterly product durability data for 20 02–20 04 in Chu and
hintagunta (2011) are originally obtained from Technology Busi-
ess Research Inc (TBRI). TBRI conducts a quarterly survey of cor-
orate information technology buying behavior and customer satis-
action of x86 servers, covering various dimensions of server qual-
ty. The evaluation questions are administered on a seven-point
ikert scale, where 1 is “worst or totally dissatisﬁed” and 7 is “ex-
ellent or totally satisﬁed.” Dell has the highest mean score of 6.21
SD = .07) on product durability, though it is only slightly higherle of durability in marketing channel strategy of durable goods 
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Table 1 
Regression of manufacturer (wholesale), reseller (retail) and channel proﬁt. a 
Manufacturer proﬁt Reseller proﬁt b Channel proﬁt b 
(wholesale) (retail) (wholesale + retail) 
est. se t est. se t est. se t 
HP 46.941 13.399 3.503 14.760 4.882 3.023 57.349 16.870 3.399 
IBM 46.793 13.395 3.493 14.766 4.882 3.025 57.272 16.867 3.395 
Dell 46.897 13.399 3.500 
1Q2002 −0.032 0.018 −1.751 -0.001 0.007 −0.072 0.006 0.026 0.241 
2Q2002 -0.072 0.017 −4.204 0.0 0 0 0.007 0.027 −0.024 0.024 −1.004 
3Q2002 0.050 0.017 2.982 0.009 0.007 1.343 0.098 0.023 4.274 
4Q2002 0.084 0.017 5.049 0.012 0.007 1.762 0.151 0.023 6.708 
1Q2003 -0.038 0.017 −2.176 0.002 0.007 0.290 0.0 0 0 0.024 0.015 
2Q2003 0.040 0.024 1.699 −0.007 0.010 −0.755 0.027 0.034 0.803 
3Q2003 0.027 0.021 1.308 −0.008 0.009 -0.902 0.043 0.031 1.365 
4Q2003 0.049 0.020 2.402 −0.001 0.009 −0.134 0.039 0.031 1.265 
1Q2004 0.014 0.018 0.771 0.0 0 0 0.008 0.019 0.027 0.028 0.949 
2Q2004 −0.008 0.016 −0.515 0.008 0.006 1.240 0.064 0.022 2.912 
3Q2004 0.023 0.016 1.397 0.002 0.007 0.355 0.083 0.023 3.634 
Warranty duration −0.004 0.0 0 0 −12.133 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 −2.548 -0.004 0.0 0 0 −8.103 
Durability −14.608 4.359 −3.351 −4.803 1.591 −3.019 −18.296 5.497 −3.328 
Durability 2 1.144 0.355 3.225 0.394 0.130 3.038 1.469 0.448 3.281 
Brand ﬁxed effects yes yes yes 
N 1163 425 425 
R 2 0.311 0.101 0.394 
a Manufacturer proﬁt = (wholesale price - manufacturer marginal cost)/wholesale price. Reseller proﬁt = (retail price −
retail marginal cost)/retail price. Channel proﬁt = (retail price − manufacturer marginal cost)/retail price 
b Retail and channel proﬁts only apply to indirect channels where Dell did not have presence in this period. 
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b  han HP (Mean = 6.18, SD = .09), and IBM’s score is the lowest but
till above 6.0 (SD = .07). 
We regress manufacturer’s proﬁt R , t , retailer’s proﬁt πR , t and
hannel proﬁt πC , t on product durability as follows: 
M,t = α0 + α1 γM,t + α2 γ 2 M,t + α3 X M,t + ε t 
πR,t = β0 + β1 γM,t + β2 γ 2 M,t + β3 X M,t + e t 
C,t = λ0 + λ1 γM,t + λ2 γ 2 M,t + λ3 X M,t + ξt 
Where X M , t is a list of control variables, including manufacturer
arranty duration, manufacturer ﬁxed effects, brand ﬁxed effects,
nd quarter ﬁxed effects. The results are in Table 1 . As predicted by
ur theory, there exists a convex relationship between manufac-
urer proﬁtability and product durability, between reseller’s prof-
tability and product durability, and between channel proﬁtabil-
ty and product durability. For all three regressions, the linear co-
ﬃcient of durability is negative and highly signiﬁcant, and the
uadratic coeﬃcient of durability is positive and highly signiﬁcant,
roviding strong empirical support for our theory. This also adds
ace validity to our theoretical model. 
The empirical results also generate some managerial insights
hich are aligned with our theoretical results. First, product dura-
ility is signiﬁcantly related to the companies’ proﬁtability. For
urable product manufacturers, durability is an important deci-
ion. Second, when the durability is relatively small, increasing the
urability is not always good. But when it exceeds a threshold, in-
reasing durability can increase proﬁts. This reminds manufactur-
rs’ that they need to consider their products’ current durability
nd ﬁnd the threshold so that the decision of increasing durability
ould really beneﬁt. 
. Conclusions 
Even though many durable goods manufacturers have adopted
ual-channel supply chains to market their products, there is scant
iterature addressing product durability and its impact on play-
rs’ optimal strategies in a dual-channel supply chain. We thusPlease cite this article as: W. Yan et al., Clicks versus Bricks: The ro
manufacturers, European Journal of Operational Research (2017), http:/eneralize Arya, Mittendorf and Sappington (2007) ’s model to the
rea of marketing durables in dual-channel supply chains. Speciﬁ-
ally, by analyzing a two-period dual-channel supply chain, we in-
estigate how product durability and the channel structure create
trategic issues that are signiﬁcantly different from those involved
n the management of a dual-channel for nondurables. 
To generate managerial insights into the issues of product
urability and the channel structure, we characterize the optimal
trategies of both parties and derive a number of propositions and
onclusions. One important result of our analysis is that the man-
facturer may be worse off selling online; that is, under certain
onditions, it is optimal for the manufacturer to open an inactive
-channel and not accept orders online. This ﬁnding is consistent
ith the practice reﬂected in the dual-channel programs of 3M,
EC, and Whirlpool, which accept no orders online but simply use
he Internet as a medium for product information provision and
eseller links. 
Another important result of our analysis is that we are able
o generalize the results in the literature on dual-channel supply
hains, in particular, Arya, Mittendorf and Sappington (2007) , who
how that the retailer can beneﬁt from encroachment even when
t admits no synergies and facilitates neither product differentia-
ion nor price discrimination. In this paper, we show that this ar-
ument depends greatly on both product durability and direct sell-
ng cost. In fact, our analysis of a two-period dual-channel sup-
ly chain with different product durability demonstrates that, con-
rary to Arya, Mittendorf and Sappington (2007) ’s results, if prod-
ct durability is moderate, for any direct selling cost, manufacturer
ncroachment is always detrimental to the reseller and its bright
ide disappears. 
We acknowledge a few limitations of our model. First, given
ur focus on durability, we abstract away other factors, including
trategic choice of leasing and selling, which can potentially play
n important role in a dual-channel supply chain with durables.
econd, some of our assumptions, such as the monopoly manu-
acturer, complete information, and zero production costs, could
e relaxed in future research. Third, we view the reseller as ale of durability in marketing channel strategy of durable goods 
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Z  brick-and-mortar reseller, an assumption that, although common
in the literature of E-commerce ( Arya, Mittendorf & Sappington,
2007 ; Cai, 2010; Chen, Zhang, & Sun, 2012; Tsay & Agrawal, 2004;
Xiong et al., 2012 ), does not reﬂect the actuality that many re-
sellers have ventured into the online world. Finally, we assume
that consumers show no preference between the e-channel and
the reseller channel, whereas in reality, consumers may exhibit dif-
ferent preferences over different distribution channels, as is found
in Chu, Chintagunta, and Vilcassim (2007) . This latter in fact opens
a potentially interesting avenue of research: incorporation into the
model’s demand functions of consumer preferences for services
provided by durables in different distributions. 
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